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AUTONOMY AND FREE SPEECH  
C. Edwin Baker* 
The legitimacy of the legal order depends, in part, on it 
respecting the autonomy that it must attribute to the people 
whom it asks to obey its laws. Despite the plethora of values 
served by speech, the need for this respect, I claim, provides the 
proper basis for giving free speech constitutional status. 
To justify this claim requires development of five points. 
First, because the concept of autonomy (or the analogous 
concept of liberty, treated here as largely interchangeable) is 
notoriously slippery and subject to varying usages, Part I 
specifies the particular conception of autonomy that I consider 
constitutionally relevant and distinguishes it from a prominent 
alternative that, I believe, should be central legislatively as long 
as the legislation is consistent with the first conception. Second, 
since this version of autonomy is, in a sense, simply stipulated, 
the claim that it is the relevant conception for establishing legal 
legitimacy and, hence, should have a constitutionally 
foundational role requires defense and must be connected to 
constitutional interpretation. That is the subject of Part II. Part 
II also considers the often raised question of whether any 
constitutional or foundational role for autonomy should or even 
can be limited to speech or expressive behavior. Third, it must 
be shown that this conception of autonomy has sufficient bite to 
give relatively determinate answers to important First 
Amendment issues. Fourth, this proposed content must survive 
reflective equilibrium. For these tasks, giving protection to 
autonomy need not, and probably should not, duplicate (or 
merely describe or explain) existing constitutional holdings but 
should lead to a satisfying account of why many holdings are 
right and an appealing (or at least plausible) explanation of 
which other holdings should be rejected. Part III considers these 
two issues. Finally, interwoven into the remarks is development 
 
 *  Before his death in December of 2009, C. Edwin Baker was the Nicholas F. 
Gallicchio Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
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of a view that, rather than free speech being an essential 
attribute of an otherwise undefended but merely described 
theory of democracy or, maybe, of “our democracy,” legal 
legitimacy—and respect for autonomy—requires both 
constitutional democracy and also broad speech freedom that 
encompasses non-political speech as a necessary limit on 
majoritarian or popular rule. 
Those who disparage autonomy as a basic, virtually absolute 
First Amendment value usually take one of three tacks. First, 
they stipulate or imply that autonomy (or liberty) refers to an 
individual doing whatever she chooses.1 This stipulation, often 
an intellectually lazy way to avoid thinking through the legal 
implications of a state commitment to respect autonomy, makes 
the term virtually meaningless for purposes of constructive legal 
theory or political theory (but maybe not moral theory where 
the question is often, “should I do this act, obey this law?”). Part 
I offers an alternative stipulation that, Part II claims, is required 
by constitutional and political theory. Second, they treat a laissez 
faire economic order as an implicit aspect of respecting 
autonomy—a view illustrated by many critical comments here.2 
Recognizing the problem this claim has for my views, I focused 
on and rejected this claim in my first published writing about 
free speech,3 and restate my rejection here in Part III’s dis-
cussion of commercial speech. I conclude that right-wing 
libertarian theory invokes an ideologically useful (to them) but 
intellectually indefensible conception of autonomy.4 Third, most 
plausibly, those who do not regard autonomy as an absolute 
value, view the only humanly meaningful conception of auton-
omy to be some version of substantive autonomy, a view that 
 
 1. Compare Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A 
Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 624–25 (2011) with C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free 
Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 981 (1997) (“[T]he harmfulness of behavior does not, as a 
general matter, justify legal limits on liberty.”). Post believes that all past societies, which 
I would add have all been objectionably hierarchical or oppressive or both, have 
coercively (legally) enforced civility rules. I certainly agree that, in some form, such rules 
have helped constitute the community on which individual identity depends, but this 
does not support his view that what would begin to unravel if enforcement were left to 
voluntary compliance would be society as opposed to hierarchy and oppression. 
 2. See, e.g., Post, supra note 1, at 627–28. 
 3. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of 
Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976) (arguing that a complete denial of first amendment 
protection for commercial speech is required by first amendment theory). 
 4. C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected 
Liberty,134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 815 (1986) (“While a formal conception of liberty 
encompasses the right to participate in this collective decisionmaking, it does not dictate 
the existence of any particular set of economic opportunities.”). 
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would lead, for example, to the type of balancing advocated by 
Steve Shiffrin.5 In the face of this pragmatic challenge, Part II 
seeks to show that a formal conception has relevance as a side 
constraint on law necessary for legal legitimacy and appropriate 
for constitutional theory. If successful, this illustrates the civil 
libertarian instinct that the constitution restrains the “means” 
government uses to pursue even good ends as well as prohibits 
subordinating or enslaving people as permissible ends. 
I. THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY6 
A person’s autonomy might reasonably be conceived as her 
capacity to pursue successfully the life she endorses—self-
authored at least in the sense that, no matter how her image of a 
meaningful life originates, she now can endorse that life for 
reasons that she accepts. Surely complete autonomy in this sense 
is never perfectly realized but will exist only more or less on 
various continuums. Such autonomy is dependent on the 
presence, often the distribution, of material resources, 
psychological resources, and other natural and social conditions. 
Policy measures—laws or distributions—that increase one 
person’s autonomy in this sense will often decrease another 
person’s. This and related conceptions of autonomy I will call 
substantive theories. My general view is that promoting 
substantive autonomy, along with matters of collective self-
definition, should be a major aim of the state and the legal order. 
Still, the precise choice of state aims is an appropriate subject of 
politics, which inevitably balances advantages for those with 
 
 5. Steven Shiffrin, Dissent, Democratic Participation, and First Amendment 
Methodology, 97 VA. L. REV. 559, 559–60 (2011). 
 6. The approach to autonomy presented in this section, implicit in all my First 
Amendment writing, is explicitly developed in C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and 
Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 21 SOC. 
PHIL. & POL’Y 215 (2004). I recognize the diversity of uses of the term. For example, my 
“formal” conception, because of its emphasis on an individual’s right to rely on her own 
conceptions of the good and the right in respect to her use of her body or voice, might be 
viewed as the opposite of autonomy in a Kantian sense because such uses reflect 
heteronomy rather than self-legislation free of phenomenal influences or conceptions of 
the good. Possibly my usage reflects my first approaching the need for such a word from 
the perspective of legal and constitutional rather than moral theory. In any event, some 
label is needed to describe the principles I wish to defend describing the conception that 
a state must attribute to its subjects whom it wishes to obligate; given my stipulated 
usage, autonomy seems to work. Perhaps Tim Scanlon would want to criticize my specific 
stipulated usage—or, maybe argue that no principles, putting aside the specific label, are 
useful in this area but, instead, each issue should be discussed on its own bottom without 
attempts to describe defend general principles. See T. M. Scanlon, Baker on Autonomy, 
27 CONST. COMMENT. 321–23 (2011). 
!!BAKER-272-AUTONOMYANDFREESPEECH3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011  9:12 AM 
254 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:251 
 
some ideals against advantages for those with other conceptions 
of the good.7 The key claim to be advanced here, however, is a 
caveat: pursuit of this and other state aims should only use 
means that respect a more formal conception of autonomy of 
each person.8 
In the formal conception, autonomy consists of a person’s 
authority (or right) to make decisions about herself—her own 
meaningful actions and usually her use of her resources—as long 
as her actions do not block others’ similar authority or rights. 
This formal autonomy in relation to one’s self does not include 
any right to exercise power over others. It does, however, 
encompass self-expressive rights that include, for example, a 
right to seek to persuade or unite or associate with others—or to 
offend, expose, condemn, or disassociate with them. This formal 
conception might seem relatively easy to apply in relation to 
speech though clarification is useful even there. More difficult 
may be applying it to other behavior. Nevertheless, I have 
argued elsewhere that this formal conception is coherent and 
warrants virtually absolute protection from, and respect by, the 
state especially in relation to self-expressive or value-expressive 
behavior.9 
Three features of this formal conception should be noted. 
(Hereafter, references only to autonomy should, unless the 
context clearly indicates otherwise, be understood to refer to this 
formal conception.) First, a person’s formal autonomy is not 
limited to acts that do not harm another person’s substantive 
autonomy but rather is limited to those acts that do not interfere 
with another’s equal formal autonomy. Most obviously, A’s 
autonomous acts can harm B competitively, by persuading C in a 
manner harmful to B’s goals. A can also convince B, for better 
or worse, to have some view or follow some ideal that B would 
not otherwise have or pursue—a pursuit that can damage B’s (or 
others’) substantive autonomy. Alice might convince Betty that 
she is personally worthless or that she should only act to serve 
Alice’s desires. Alice can convince Carol that Betty, Carol’s 
spouse, is worthless or unfaithful, making Betty’s life miserable 
 
 7. C. Edwin Baker, Rawls, Equality, and Democracy, 34 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM  
203, 203 (2008) (arguing that John Rawls’s view of the goals of democracy is not 
justifiable). 
 8. The term “liberty” could (occasionally herein does) substitute for “autonomy” 
and I do not intend to signal anything by the substitution. My two uses of autonomy 
roughly correspond to a common but often confused distinction between negative and 
positive liberty, with substantive autonomy paralleling the later. 
 9. See generally Baker, supra note 1. 
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when C leaves. Or Alice might simply persuade Carol to choose 
to socialize with Alice rather than Betty to Betty’s great regret. 
In each case, B and C still have authority, are still authorized, to 
make choices contrary to the choices to which A’s speech leads 
them. Political and religious analogs to these harms are 
straightforward. As noted below, however, the characterization 
should change in each example if A creates the effect by lying 
(or speaking without regard to her belief in the truth of what she 
says). In general, though, statements of A, even if harmful of B, 
are exercises of A’s autonomy and are not coercive of either B 
or C. 
Second, in order to identify when someone’s behavior 
interferes with another’s decisions presupposes some 
distribution, constituted by a legitimate legal order, of decision 
making authority. This distribution, largely constituted by 
property rights, should reflect the interaction of a democratically 
authorized (legal) framework, individual acts, and moral 
requirements of equality and justice. Though some argument is 
needed, the later moral constraint leads to a demand that 
allocation of a person’s body should be based, at least to a 
considerable degree not further investigated here, on respect for 
the autonomy of the person whose body it is. Democratic 
decision making should not be understood as authorized to 
establish slavery—or authorized to create a baseline distribution 
to A (possibly a husband or parent) of general authority over B’s 
body or, more relevantly here, B’s speech—though proper 
paternalism in respect to children raises issues that I put aside. 
The fact that meaningful opportunities to lead a self-authored 
life (i.e., substantive autonomy) requires various material 
conditions—beginning with sustenance and shelter and maybe 
education and medical care—does not create implications for the 
required respect for (formal) autonomy but rather is either part 
of the domain of basic (i.e., constitutional) equality or a matter 
of democracy, with its general authority over distributive (or 
redistributive) matters. Formal autonomy and formal equality 
are both basic but do different, non-conflicting work in relation 
to a legitimate legal order. In contrast, though hugely significant, 
substantive autonomy and substantive equality are largely and 
properly subject to variable democratic promotion. 
Third, although this formal conception of autonomy 
encompasses a person’s choices to self-expressive use of her 
resources or speech (through persuasion or provision of 
information) to negatively affect another’s realization of her 
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aims, it does not encompass various violent, coercive or 
manipulative actions as practices that society must respect. 
These crucial terms, especially coercion and manipulation, 
require careful and quite restricted elaboration. They provide a 
basis to see “true threats”10 (maybe as opposed to expressive or 
warning threats) and manipulative lies11 as not merely potentially 
harmful to the other but as being intrinsically disrespectful of 
and, therefore, unprotected interferences with others’ autonomy. 
Importantly, these speech practices do not aim to communicate 
the speaker’s own views or values, even if in ways that cause 
harm to others, but rather attempt to undermine the integrity of 
the other person’s decisionmaking authority. 
A common objection to an autonomy theory of free speech 
takes the following form: No principle of respecting autonomy 
can distinguish speech and other behavior. Since constitutional 
principles should not and surely do not protect autonomy 
generally, speech’s status of being a purposeful exercise of 
autonomy cannot provide a sound basis for explaining its 
constitutional protection. I would be happy to defend respect for 
autonomy on such a broader plane—that represents my 
libertarian instinct—though the argument becomes quite 
complex. As an example, it could lead to a right to engage in 
consensual sex in that this sex, like virtually all intentional 
actions, is expressive. Even the sex act’s more narrowly 
communicative aspects are often quite obvious. The association 
necessarily involved in intercourse provided the First 
Amendment grounding for Griswold v Connecticut.12 These 
libertarian arguments, however, leave existing constitutional 
doctrine far behind. Thus, I do not rely on them here but instead 
suggest ways to limit the autonomy claim to speech or 
expression. 
The most obvious point is positivist—the text of the First 
Amendment refers to speech, which might be treated as 
extending to expression but which most people would not 
 
 10. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (holding that the First Amendment 
allows state to ban “true threats,” in which “the speaker means to communicate a serious 
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence”). 
 11. Cf. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (describing the lie, used as “a 
tool” to achieve “ends,” as not protected under “mantle of the Constitution”).  
 12. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). Douglas’s opinion for the 
Court is best read as resting on association as a “penumbral” aspect of the First 
Amendment, with the privacy penumbras of other Amendments being noted merely as 
illustrations. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding that a 
Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sex acts was unconstitutional). 
!!BAKER-272-AUTONOMYANDFREESPEECH3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011  9:12 AM 
2011] AUTONOMY AND FREE SPEECH 257 
 
consider properly encompassing riding a motorcycle without a 
helmet, even if that behavior were considered expressive. Even 
if theoretical reasons exist for broader protection, the particular 
constitutional order in existence might justify not going further. 
A more normative and, to an extent, pragmatic point relates 
to the complexity of paternalism. If self-regarding could be 
distinguished from other-regarding behavior, as Millian liberals 
traditionally tried to do (but see the next paragraph), 
paternalism is possibly the main remaining potential justification 
for intervention in the first. As a bedrock libertarian principle, 
general opposition to paternalism (at least by government as 
applied to adults) connects closely to respect for autonomy—a 
person making choices about herself. Still, the issue is 
complicated and contested. Some arguments for paternalism in 
limited circumstances seem plausible. Typically these arguments 
become more persuasive the more the unwisely chosen behavior 
risks permanent limits on a person’s capacities and the less the 
restricted choices seem central to her identity. Empirically, I 
suspect such criteria will seldom support paternalistic limits on 
speech (which can be important for who a person is but seldom 
leave the future person with less capabilities) but give arguable 
support for limits on unprotected motorcycle riding or drug 
abuse. Add to this distinction a greater suspicion that often 
limits on speech are not really motivated by serving the person’s 
own good and a plausible practical argument emerges counseling 
greater respect for autonomy in relation to speech choices than 
for behavior in general. Whether ultimately persuasive, each 
point provides a rationale for limiting strong constitutional 
respect for autonomy to the context of speech or expression. 
Finally, I must observe that some critics of autonomy theory 
are simply not careful to understand the implication of generally 
protecting (or respecting) autonomy. Their claims often involve 
positing an overly broad and untheorized conception of 
autonomy. Autonomy as specified here, however, in no sense 
covers all a person’s desired behavior—it is fully consistent with 
most law, what I have called elsewhere “allocation rules,” which 
determine what resources a person has a right to make decisions 
about or use.13 Generally, respect for autonomy involves respect 
for a person’s choices about herself and, maybe, her resources up 
until her choice involves taking choice away from another about 
 
 13. Baker, supra note 1, at 227. 
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himself or his resources—and, therefore, application of the 
concept presupposes some distribution. 
This distinction between autonomy and interference with 
another cover roughly the same ground that some theorists, as 
noted above, tried to find in the distinction between self- or 
other-regarding behavior. The problem with their arguments is 
that a person’s purportedly self-regarding behavior typically 
affects who she is in a manner that subsequently affects her 
interactions with others. Consequently, no significant realm of 
solely self-regarding behavior remains—the point being that no 
one is an island. This consequence casts doubt on designating 
any behavior as purely self-regarding, at least in consequences. 
Moreover, the distinction does not generate any obvious 
protection for speech in that, unlike, say, masturbation, painting, 
or mountain climbing, communication is definitionally and 
purposefully other-regarding. My suspicion is that theorists’ 
focus on the fact of harm led them to an attempted distinction 
between self- and other-regarding behavior. Their distinction, 
however, should have been on how acts cause harm—for 
example, by an exercise of autonomy, as formally specified here, 
or by violence or coercion. Most expression that anyone wishes 
to restrict can be understood to harm some listeners or third 
parties, often much more seriously than many forms of criminal 
behavior. The characteristic way speech—certainly 
constitutionally protected speech—harms others relates, 
however, to why it should be protected as an exercise of the 
speaker’s autonomy. Speech harms by being informative or 
persuasive—operating through the mind of the other and 
thereby gives the other at least the theoretical possibility of 
rejecting the message or giving it her own chosen significance. 
This feature of how speech achieves its effect is, I believe, 
why Thomas Emerson insisted on the distinction between speech 
and action,14 according constitutional protection only to behavior 
that he believed partook more of the qualities of speech than of 
action—though he emphatically would protect some non-verbal 
activity as speech and deny protection to some verbal actions. 
The distinction he intuited between the behavior he 
characterized as speech and that which he characterized as 
action related not to the amount of harm each could cause but to 
the manner in which it caused harm. If the harm to either the 
 
 14. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
(1971) (surveying free speech law). 
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listeners or third parties resulted from audience members’ 
mental assimilation of the intended meaning that the speaker 
honestly expressed, the expressive behavior did not violate the 
audience members’ or other third parties’ own formal autonomy. 
This feature contrasts with the way other criminalized behavior 
(“action” in Emerson’s terminology), including speech 
criminalized as fraud, perjury, or manipulative lies or speech 
integral to criminal activities, typically does violate or 
purposefully undermines other’s ability to make her own 
decisions. In Emerson’s analysis, speech or expression is not only 
a constitutionally specified aspect of autonomy but it is a 
paradigmatic, and an easily specifiable and hugely socially and 
personally significant, case of autonomy and should be “fully” 
protected by the First Amendment. 
II. THE BASIS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
FREE SPEECH 
A constitutional theory of free speech depends on two 
features: a theory of constitutional interpretation and the 
specific contours of speech protection that this interpretative 
methodology picks out. The great value(s) of speech cannot in 
itself explain or identify its constitutional status. The economy 
and war have great human significance but we leave regulation 
of one and declaration of the other to Congress. An explanation 
is needed to explain why—and which—speech to treat 
differently. Speech, for instance, might be central for providing 
information and argument relevant for the hugely important 
tasks of finding truth (compare trials) or reasoned decision 
making (compare parliamentary debates, administrative 
hearings, or peer reviewed publications) or democratic will-
formation (compare elections). Still, in each case, these 
objectives might be more wisely or more fairly advanced if 
speech is intelligently and appropriately regulated. Of course, 
different theories of constitutional interpretation can lead to 
identical conclusions—as John Rawls pointed out in a different 
context related to a possible overlapping consensus of 
comprehensive views. I simply outline my key assumptions 
concerning interpretation before moving to my claim that the 
most appealing approach supports seeing the constitutional 
status of free speech as required respect for a person’s autonomy 
in her speech choices. Clearly, though, despite my connecting the 
topics of proper constitutional interpretation and proper scope 
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of speech protection, one could agree with my analysis of one 
but not the other. 
A. INTERPRETATION 
Legal practice as we have developed it treats the 
constitutional text itself as unchanging (absent Article 5 
processes) but it also treats changing judicial interpretations as 
having equal status as constitutional law. Interpretative 
practices, precedents, and text are equally parts of our accepted 
“rule of recognition.” On the basis of acceptance, no part of this 
whole is in any sense superior even though only the textual part 
is unalterable (except by Article 5 processes)—with alteration 
coming from interpretations that we come to accept. These 
observations do not, however, yet say anything about how 
proper interpretative legal practices should treat—should detract 
from or supplement, both of which precedent unquestionably 
does—the unchanging text. Nor does it yet explain interpretative 
change: when and why particular doctrines are properly rejected. 
Much more needs to be said, but my operative premise is 
that the Constitution should be understood as an attempt to set 
up a legitimate and workable government—or at least that 
constitutional interpretation should posit this aim. Constitutional 
interpretative and judicial practice often can and, I have 
argued,15 should be understood as a conversation, making 
periodic enduring gains of insight and less frequent serious 
missteps but properly always guided by that aim. Consider, 
however, other possibilities. 
A straightforward rule of law originalism might claim, first, 
that the Constitution is law because those who created it were 
“authorized” to create the content and, second, this fact requires 
or at least justifies that content remaining fixed until a properly 
authorized process changes it. This “originalist” 
constitutionalism, though, begs key questions. Who has or had 
authority to authorize any authority of the framers? What were 
the framers authorized to do? What did the framers or ratifiers 
actually do? It is hardly obvious that a text should be coercively 
binding law for those who do not authorize or accept its 
creation—and certainly, most people living in the territory at the 
time of adoption were not in the electorate, many of those who 
were in the electorate voted “no,” and no one living today 
 
 15. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 272–83 (1989). 
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authorized this activity. Something more needs to be said to each 
of these categories of people before they have would any reason 
to conform to some purported constitutional content. 
Hart emphasized that his “rule of recognition” is not, 
cannot, be valid but can only be accepted and that it must be so 
accepted at least by some officials in order to operate as law. 
When do they have grounds to accept it? In the face of the 
questions of the last paragraph for which there are no deductive 
answers, those who, as it turns out in practice, exercise power 
under the constitution have an obligation toward dissenters—
those whom they ask to obey—to show why the 
legal/constitutional order is one that the dissenters should or at 
least reasonably could accept. Without those exercising power 
being convinced that they have made this showing, they have no 
good faith basis to claim that dissenters have an obligation to 
obey. Thus, the conversational aim of constitutional law (or 
interpretation) should be agreement on the constitution’s 
acceptability even if in the real world that agreement should not 
be predicted.16 Proper interpretation takes this as its orienting 
aim. 
This understanding of the interpretative obligation of 
current officials would not see those original framers as 
authorized to create simply any constitution that a ratifying 
majority accepts. That earlier majority had no inherent authority 
to impose on others. Rather these officials should see those 
framers as authorized to create—or as aiming to create—a 
workable and legitimate legal order that those creators and their 
empowered successors stand ready to defend as providing a 
constitutional framework that those who dissent can and should 
accept. If this is the nature and extent of the framers’ authority, 
they would be unreasonable to think that their own insights 
inevitably provide all the right answers to all questions of 
constitutional design. Rather, since these right answers were 
their only proper aim, the view that can be best attributed to 
them is that they saw themselves as making a first stab at an 
answer, an initial move that leaves this issue of legitimacy 
(agreeability) and hence of content continually on the table. 
Their more modest but reasonable self-understanding is that 
their efforts initiated the conversation—with Article 5 not so 
 
 16. Below I give reasons not to expect symmetry. What is required of those who 
exercise power to justify their coercive acts is not enough to make obedience obligatory 
for those who dissent.  
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much the only basis for change but rather a power of the 
populace to redirect the conversation if they conclude that it has 
gone too far off-track. 
The merits or demerits of our actual constitutional order are 
surely contestable, but clearly the constitutional order that 
people historically did create—the rule of recognition that 
officials and the public generally have accepted—treats these 
further judicial interpretative activities, often guided by the aim 
to create a workable and legitimate constitution, as part of our 
open-textured rule of recognition. Any different originalist claim 
about the place or status of constitutional interpretation 
represents advocacy, based on plausible but ultimately (I think) 
unpersuasive normative assumptions, for creating a different, 
purportedly desirable, but in this country, rejected rule of 
recognition.17 Such originalist claims do not correspond to what 
dominant authorities now or in the past have accepted as 
constitutional law. Consequently, the best interpretation and 
“our” existing constitutional interpretations of the First 
Amendment should and usually do aim at content necessary—
but given the general propriety of democratic choice, no more 
than the content necessary—for the legitimacy of the legal order. 
B. LEGITIMACY18 
Law purports to be authoritative in creating a framework 
for interaction in society—or, as Hart emphasized in his path 
breaking critique of Austin’s positivism, law purports to 
empower and obligate, not merely oblige people. The question 
is: what conditions must the legal order meet to justify its claim 
to create real obligations—or to be legitimate? Can any legal 
process or legal content (substance) justify use of otherwise 
immoral force or coercion to enforce the law? Many answers 
have been advanced, some I think overtly unpersuasive despite 
impressive pedigrees (Hobbesian answers, for example). 
Moreover, many answers are overlapping, possibly telling part of 
the story or pointing to relevant considerations. Two proposed 
answers, however, are particularly relevant for what they suggest 
 
 17. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Precedent-Based Constitutional 
Adjudication, Acceptance, and the Rule of Recognition, in MATTHEW ADLER & 
KENNETH EINAR HIMMA, THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
47, 50–55 (2009) (arguing that Article VI does not exhaust the practice of recognition). 
 18. This section overtly uses, maybe not always felicitously, concepts drawn without 
citation from various theorists including Kant, Scanlon, Habermas, and Michelman as 
well as my own work.  
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about a constitutional theory of free speech. I argue the first is 
not so much wrong as inadequate and the second, going beyond 
the first, is more powerful in showing what the state needs to 
offer in asserting that a person should accept the legal order as 
obligatory and providing a proper basis for understanding free 
speech. Of course, these broad issues cannot be fully dealt with 
here. I offer only an outline showing a direction that discussion 
could follow. 
Democracy is one answer. Not only does social life 
necessarily require behavioral norms but a reasonable argument 
is that at least many of these norms achieve their ends much 
better if they are authoritative and enforced in the manner 
described as a legal order. There will always be dissent to the 
favored norms. All specifications of legal rules inevitably 
produce losers, those who claim other rules would be better. A 
democratic process, however, in one sense “equally” respects 
people as properly having a “say” in the rules they live under. 
(Though “equally” only in a formal sense of “voice”—in another 
way, democracy gives those in the majority more than it gives 
losers whose objections potentially have no effect on resulting 
norms.) On this ground, democracy is arguably the best that can 
be done, given the impossibility (or, at least, lack of pragmatic 
appeal) of anarchic or completely voluntaristic social life, for 
justifying the legitimacy of the social order. The pay-off for the 
First Amendment is the possibility that a theory of democracy 
can ground a theory of free speech. 
Three immediate problems with this answer are: (i) The 
proper conception of democracy needs specification. (ii) The 
specification cannot be merely sociological or historical but must 
rely on moral or ethical considerations. (iii) Both the status and 
source of these moral considerations needs explication. 
Consideration of these problems, taken up in turn, provides, I 
believe, one route to a preferable and richer theory. 
Obviously, any democratic theory of a constitutional status 
for free speech must rely on a particular conception of 
democracy. For example, constitutional democracy could make 
the legitimacy of majority decision-making depend on the 
process not making any decisions violating particular substantive 
rights—rights which might include some form of voice within the 
process or which might include legal respect for individuals’ 
general authority to make autonomous speech choices. Many 
believe that something like the second conception of democracy 
is accepted in the United States and many other constitutional 
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democracies. Why is not this conception, rather than the first 
theory that sees democracy more purely procedurally and that 
gives majority rule a more expansive authority to restrict at least 
non-political speech, the better theory of democracy? The issue 
is not definitional—some substantive argument must be given. 
A procedural theory that asserts that democracy implies 
authority to decide any question by “majoritarian processes,” 
whatever these processes are, is overtly question begging. Why 
accept a mere procedural theory? And how does one determine 
and why should one accept specific majoritarian processes? Even 
if a procedural conception were favored, logically it requires 
freedom (of speech) only to propose an issue for democratic 
vote. After certain proposals are made, for example, after a 
proposal to eliminate an existing ban of talking about a 
particular issue, procedure rules could require an immediate 
“call of the question.” This procedural view presumably allows 
majoritarian decisions to prohibit or regulate any speech, 
including public discourse—except for guaranteeing the right of 
legislators to propose and then vote, maybe immediately, on 
proposals to repeal an existing restriction. (Compare Robert’s 
Rules on non-debatable motions.) Limits on speech—for 
example, prohibitions on speech supporting communist or Nazi 
parties or agendas or, within an electoral campaign, on the use of 
music jingles, “excessive” expenditures, certain promises of 
political candidates related to their proposed job performance, 
or announcements by a (judicial) candidate of her views on 
matters which may come before her if elected19—could be 
explained either on grounds of hypothesized objectionable 
qualities of the prohibited speech or as ways to improve 
democratic deliberation. These restrictions would embody 
democratic decision making when adopted. Each limit on 
speech, however, conflicts with other procedural interpretations 
of democracy. In other words, a commitment to democracy does 
not tell whether any significant guarantee of free political (or 
non-political) speech should exist. 
If a procedural conception of democracy provides a basis 
for a free speech guarantee, it could provide the guarantee with 
either of at least two justifications, which lead to different 
 
 19. The first two in this list exist in some democratic countries. Versions of the last 
three were enacted here but then struck down by the Court. Republican Party of Minn. v. 
White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (judicial candidate announcements); Brown v. Hartlage, 
456 U.S. 46, 61 (1982) (campaign promises); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39–60 (1976) 
(campaign expenditures). 
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protections. Meiklejohn is normally seen as offering the first, 
apparently valuing free speech simply for its instrumentalist 
contribution to deliberation: “What is essential is not that 
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be 
said.”20 This instrumental argument, though restricted to the 
political sphere, has all the weaknesses of any marketplace of 
ideas theory and I will put it aside—as arguably Meiklejohn 
himself did when he referred to, “the sheer stupidity of the 
policies of this nation,” a stupidity that speaks against the 
argument.21 The alternative, also offered by Meiklejohn, is 
virtually definitional, purportedly following deductively from the 
people’s decision to “govern themselves.”22 The appeal of this 
interpretation of democracy as deductively including individual 
rights to engage in speech, at least in the public sphere, follows 
most obviously from—I believe embodies—respect for the 
individual as an agent, as an autonomous being. This value-
based interpretation of democracy does not, however, show 
whether there are proper limits on democracy but certainly 
raises the possibility that limits should reflect the same values as 
the justification. 
Only value commitments—not abstract logic, deduction, 
and certainly not mere facts such as history, even “our” 
interpreted history or information about “our” framers—can 
require a particular connection between democracy and free 
speech. The obvious value premise that requires that democracy 
take a form that protects people’s political speech is a principle 
that requires respect for citizen’s autonomy within the law 
making process—that views them as agents with proper claims to 
self-determination as well as having their interest in self-
realization. This respect not only gives reason to interpret 
democracy as including speech freedom but provides a ground to 
value democracy—two conclusions following from the value of 
respecting their claims for self-determination. 
The problem for this argument, however, is that it provides 
no obvious reason to limit this respect for self-government to 
collective self-governing—the political sphere—as opposed to 
 
 20. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1960). See BAKER, supra note 15 (discussing the tension in 
Meiklejohn between the two theories). This first argument is the one Robert Post 
identifies as Meiklejohn’s Mistake. ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 268–89 
(1995). 
 21. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. 
REV. 245, 263. 
 22. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 5. 
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self-governing also within private spheres. Post rightly notes that 
we might be only (or differently) committed to collective but not 
individual self-determination,23 but I wonder how that distinction 
is justified (or attributed to Americans). I conjecture that the 
two are so intrinsically intertwined that neither can really be 
guaranteed without the other, hence Habermas’s suggestion 
about the co-originality of public and private autonomy. I also 
suspect that most people in their lives rebel more at limits on 
their individual (private) than their political (public) autonomy. 
In any event, the premise of respect for self-determination, 
which most plausibly justifies protection of political speech, 
leads to the second answer to the question of legitimacy: a 
legitimate legal order must fully respect (among other things, 
e.g. equality) both individual and collective autonomy—both 
non-political and political speech. 
This last claim represents the following reasoning. Grant the 
claim that a mandated respect for autonomy provides the best 
argument for a conception of democracy whose meaning 
includes a guarantee of political speech freedom. What more can 
be said for this conception of democracy, attributed autonomy, 
and their respective extent and relationship? The legal order 
potentially contributes greatly to human actors achieving both 
individual and collective projects. The legal choices that 
contribute to projects of either sort inevitably produce losers 
who would have benefitted more from other choices. This 
“inevitability” suggests that the existence of losers cannot itself 
be an objection to the resulting order. Still, the regrettable fact 
of losers leaves open whether any principles support claims to 
limit the collective projects or collective means that are to their 
disadvantage.24 The propriety of the legal order’s promotion of 
selected conceptions of the good, for example, does not imply 
that an aim of making people losers can be a proper project, a 
proper basis of law. If the moral value of democracy lies (in part) 
in its contribution to people’s political autonomy in pursuit of 
their democratically chosen projects—with its implicit premise 
that it values these people as autonomous—democracy’s 
authority should be limited by this same value. Given this value, 
democracy (or law) should not, therefore, be authorized to enact 
 
 23. Post, supra note 1, at 626–27. 
 24. I pursue this type of reasoning to derive three principles that I argue would be 
more rational to choose within Rawls’s original position than either the difference 
principle or restricted utility, the primary alternative that he considered. Baker, supra 
note 7, at 203–04. 
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laws that disrespect, that are premised on the propriety of 
denying, a person’s autonomy (or, though less relevant here, her 
equality and maybe her dignity). This conclusion should then 
guide interpretation of the constitutional guarantee of free 
speech. It gives equal status to protecting speech as a part of 
personal, individual self-government and as an aspect of her 
participation in collective self-government. 
The above is the argument for an autonomy interpretation 
of free speech working out from a commitment to democracy. 
What is the more direct affirmative argument? People’s capacity 
to embody their values in law enables them to pursue their 
values collectively and to create a favored world. But in contrast 
to voluntary associations, the impermissibility of escape from 
law’s coercive reach makes its propriety subject to challenge by 
dissenters given the positive value of this capacity for self-
determination. Consent—or, better, agreement or self-
authorship—might solve this legitimacy question. Kantian moral 
theory might argue that a person should be governed only by 
laws that she gives—or, with considerable loss of justificatory 
force, only by law that she should or, maybe, could give herself, 
or could not reasonably reject giving to herself. Inevitably, in any 
actual legal order some will (certainly might) dissent—say “no” 
to a given law or even to the entire “constitutional” lawmaking 
practice. For this rejection to disable the use of law would 
effectively give the dissenter, gives minorities, power over 
others, which is morally problematic. For this reason, the most 
that moral theory should expect of the majority, those prepared 
to back their law with force, is that they propose only laws or 
projects for which they can in good faith give reasons to the 
dissenter for why she could and, the majority argues, should 
accept these laws. This reduced requirement is an implicit 
premise of discourse, that is, of communicative action, a process 
by which people seek agreement and crucially, is not limited to 
public discourse, but also includes private discussion such as 
ones in which a group of friends try to decide where to go to 
dinner.25 It cannot be found as implicit in a solipsistic notion of 
reason, of the categorical imperative, or an isolated individual’s 
autonomy. It looks instead to the nature of our unavoidable 
commitments within communicative action rather than to either 
 
 25. For a brief discussion, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACT AND NORMS: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 1–9 (William 
Rehg trans., 1996). 
!!BAKER-272-AUTONOMYANDFREESPEECH3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011  9:12 AM 
268 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:251 
 
agreement or to an absence of reasonable rejectability.26 Still, 
this limitation on proposals does seem to rule out certain 
proposals—such as those that positively value, as opposed to 
recognizing the inevitability, that some will disagree and become 
losers. And it rules out those that endorse limits on the 
autonomy of some as the means to advance proper ends. Thus, 
this discourse requirement leads to a “liberal” value of toleration 
of autonomy, not neutrality between conceptions of the good. 
Laws inevitably support some people’s substantive autonomy 
over that of others, but respect for formal autonomy rules out an 
affirmative purpose of restricting people’s substantive 
autonomy. On this view, legitimacy requires that the legal order 
not adopt laws restricting individuals’ expressive freedom either 
as an end or a purposeful means. 
Speech sometimes contributes to the search for truth, to 
democracy, and to substantive autonomy. Unlike these 
unpersuasive instrumentalist justifications of constitutional 
speech freedom, here the argument for toleration reflects a 
formal, but not a substantive, conception of speech autonomy. 
People cannot be expected to accept collective proposals—
laws—that value restricting their own chosen expression. In 
contrast, everyone could value many particular collective 
projects even if these projects leave people with varying and, 
sometimes, at least from their own point of view, inadequate 
speech opportunities. 
One final caveat needs emphasis. The central claim is not 
that a legal order’s respect for each person’s autonomy 
(especially, her expressive freedom) combined with respect for 
each person’s equality, dignity, and humanity suffices to leave 
each person unable to reasonably reject the legitimacy of 
particular laws or even of the legal order as a whole. Non-
rejectability is fine as a goal—an aim always implicit in dialogue, 
in communicative action—but nothing said above shows that it 
can be achieved. Some people—the religious devotee, for 
example—can have good reason to reject even the legal order 
that meets requirements of respect for people’s formal 
autonomy (and equality). The dialogic situation has two poles—
the person making a proposal and the person who can say either 
“yes” or “no.” There is no reason to assume that the first 
person’s meeting the requirements placed on her means that the 
 
 26. C. Edwin Baker, Basic Equality: Grounded Universal Commitments (2008) 
(unpublished manuscript). 
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second will have reason to respond as hoped. This distinction 
has, for example, huge implications for a theory of civil 
disobedience. Rejectability may justify an individual in violating 
a law. The concern here, however, has only been with the 
obligations placed on the lawgiver. The claim is that a legal order 
cannot reasonably claim legitimacy without (among other 
requirements) respecting people’s autonomy. 
If this criterion of legitimacy is right (obviously the 
argument here is too summary), democracy is not the starting 
point, providing a basis for the constitutional status of free 
speech. Rather law’s aspiration to legitimacy grounds both a 
properly expansive democracy and limits on democracy (in 
behalf of respecting autonomy, equality, etc.). 
Is constitutional interpretation’s reliance on moral theory 
regrettable? Avoidable?27 Moral theory—and particularly this 
favorable evaluation of autonomy—is wildly contested and its 
controversial nature might be grounds to seek to avoid it. 
Instead, maybe free speech represents simply “our” overlapping 
consensus on a democratic faith, possibly a uniquely American 
faith given our courts’ divergence from an international 
consensus on prohibiting hate speech and varying responses to 
other speech issues. The two problems are obvious. First, the 
laws Congress (and individual states) pass limiting political (and 
non-political) speech suggest that “our” consensus is not so 
clear. When the Supreme Court strikes down these laws, it must 
rely on considerations less sociological than “our” conception of 
democracy. When Congress or a state violates the Court’s 
conception of free speech (or of democracy), the Court implicitly 
claims that its conception is more justifiable—not more 
descriptive—than the legislators’. Second, as a narrow argument 
for a political speech theory, reliance only on the Supreme 
Court’s enunciation of “our conception” must still make room 
for evidence discussed in Part III that the Court’s theory is much 
broader. Inevitably, if only implicitly, legal argument must rely 
on moral commitments and these point to the autonomy theory 
of free speech. 
 
 27. Vince Blasi’s response to Post and James Weinstein in the Virginia Law Review 
symposium on the relationship between democracy and First Amendment theory 
implicitly raises these questions. See Vincent Blasi, Democratic Participation and the 
Freedom of Speech: A Response to Post and Weinstein, 97 VA. L. REV. 531 (2011). 
Obviously, lawyers and judges normally and probably wisely avoid explicit engagement 
with moral philosophy. That fact does not deny, however, that they necessarily rely on 
normative premises and, if so, that these should be evaluated and criticized on the basis 
of their persuasiveness.  
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III. DOCTRINAL FIT AND REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
The crucible of litigation, social movements, and scholarly 
debate have left us with a robust, though somewhat uneven, First 
Amendment doctrine that, I believe, overall is best justified by 
the autonomy theory offered above. Still, academic thought 
sinks to its lowest depths when its methodological ambition is to 
be an apologist for the status quo. The measure of the appeal of 
a First Amendment theory should not be the extent that it 
conforms to existing doctrine but the quality of its explanation of 
those aspects of existing doctrine that should be approved and, 
while linking meaningfully to existing constitutional discourse, 
the persuasiveness of its critique of aspects of doctrine that 
should be rejected. Though some scholars see their task to 
explain the at least legal correctness of Dred Scott, Plessy, 
Lochner, or more relevant to us, Dennis,28 at least at the time 
they were decided, with their task and theory requiring change 
as doctrine twists and turns, my hope is that I would have been 
one who, at the time of these decisions, would offer a legal 
critique, as the dissenters on the Court attempted, in addition to 
a political critique. With this criterion in mind, I consider 
doctrinal areas that the autonomy theory does better than some 
or all other theories in justifying and other areas where its merit 
lies in the critique it offers. 
Flag Salute. The poster child of autonomy theory is the 
Court’s opinion in Barnette, which forwent reliance of the 
religion clauses and gave a ringing endorsement of the school 
children’s right to abstain from saluting the flag on the basis of 
First Amendment protected liberty. The Court emphasized the 
child’s liberty, not political debate nor any marketplace of ideas. 
The political order received attention primarily in the Court’s 
recognition that its legitimacy depends on this limitation—that 
assuring secure rights will “[make] us feel safe to live under [a 
strong government],” while the compelled flag salute “invades 
the sphere of intellect and spirit,” involving the “coercive 
elimination of dissent” that ends only in “the unanimity of the 
 
 28. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951) (holding that the Smith 
Act to prevent the formation of a Communist Party does not violate the First 
Amendment). Interestingly, Frankfurter, in his remark that the revolutionary advocacy 
involved in the case “ranks low” on any scale of first amendment values, id. at 544 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring), effectively restated the democratic speech theory of 
Learned Hand from Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), 
denying that counseling law violation can be part of democratic public opinion.  
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graveyard.”29 In dissent, Justice Frankfurter, distancing himself 
from the majority’s emphasis on liberty, essentially invoked 
democratic discourse in explaining that he would vote for the 
children if the state had in any way restrained their or their 
parents’ speech repudiating the flag salute and criticizing the 
compulsion. Frankfurter emphasized that the required salute did 
not impede the children’s freedom to participate in or to place 
any views into political discourse—in fact, he hypothesized that 
prior compulsion might enhance the salience of any subsequent 
critical expression.30 But the majority rested on different 
grounds. Compulsion directly abridged children’s liberty—their 
expressive autonomy. 
Art and Music. Abstract art and compositional music, 
found, for example, in the Court’s dicta referring to Jackson 
Pollock and Arnold Schöenberg’s music,31 require a stretch to 
justify as political speech or truth propositions to test in a 
marketplace of ideas. Sure, all aesthetic experiences, like all 
experiences generally, can affect who a person is, how she sees 
the world, and thereby affect her values, politics, and notions of 
truth.32 Such explanations for their relevance to the political 
 
 29. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636, 641, 642 (1943). 
 30. See id. at 664. The majority of the Court made clear that, except for the 
legitimate strength of the state interest (they could teach patriotism by persuasion), 
nothing turned on the political or public discourse salience of the salute. It was a similar 
interest in liberty not to have to bow and get permission from the state, not the 
opportunity to participate in public discourse, that Justice Stevens emphasized in 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 169 (2002). Similarly, in 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 n.10 (1977), the Court explicitly rejected reliance 
on the possible symbolic speech argument that covering the motto on the license plate 
would make Maynard’s act a communication within public discourse. 
 31. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995). 
 32. Clearly contrary to existing doctrine, which belies any hope for his political 
participation theory to be descriptive of existing doctrine, Jim Weinstein’s suggestion 
that much speech should be protected as an aspect of privacy or liberty under the due 
process clause is reminiscent of Meiklejohn’s approach. See James Weinstein, 
Participatory Democracy as the Basis of American Free Speech Doctrine: A Reply, 97 VA. 
L. REV. 633, 656 ( 2011). Also, reminiscent is the arguable collapse of the bite of 
Meiklejohn’s theory, when in the face of criticism for the potential political relevance of 
whole categories of speech that he seemed to exclude, he expanded his category of 
democratic relevant content. Compare Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review 62 HARV. L. 
REV. 891 (1949) (reviewing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS 
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)) (criticizing Meiklejohn’s expansive con-
ception of the First Amendment), with Meiklejohn, supra note 21, at 255 (“[The First 
Amendment] is concerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a 
governmental responsibility.”) Kitchen, bedroom and front door “private” speech can 
contribute to democracy, of course. But their protection should not depend on any such 
connection. Once Weinstein grants First Amendment protection to interfamilial or 
intimate speech exclusively because it is part of “democratic discourse,” however, the 
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sphere or to a marketplace of ideas do not, however, distinguish 
them from, say, hiking in a wilderness area, cooperation in a 
barn raising, or engaging in a criminal enterprise. Though Post 
might treat these as part of public discourse that affects the 
public opinion, which democratic government should reflect, this 
is seldom the aim of the communication and this ground for 
protection surely feels far from the heart of why most people 
engage in these forms of expression or why they should be 
protected. In contrast, the liberty of the creators or performers 
and their audiences is clearly at stake and, in a free society, 
should be legally respected. 
Commercial Speech. Characterization of commercial speech 
provides a clear battle ground for free speech theories. 
Information or advice in commercial advertisements can in 
principle make the same contribution as can any other form of 
speech either to a marketplace of ideas or to the listener’s 
substantive autonomy. Protection, as Martin Redish showed 
long ago, follows.33 This speech’s potential contribution to 
democratic self-government is somewhat more complicated. If 
the democratic discourse theory focuses on the information 
potentially relevant to or that can affect self-government, 
protection again follows as Redish and then, beginning in 
Virginia Board,34 the Court recognized. If, however, democratic 
discourse focuses on citizens’ participation in the public sphere 
or her aim to contribute to public opinion, denial of 
constitutional protection would follow. Democratic legitimacy 
involves empowering citizen governors, not commercial entities. 
This second democratic argument, however, is essentially a 
restricted autonomy-based theory—one limited to the political 
sphere. 
From a (formal) autonomy theory, there are at least three—
though contestable—arguments to deny protection to 
commercial speech. First, to the extent the “free” market works 
as Karl Marx, Max Weber, and modern conservative economists 
claim, its competitive dynamics compel market participants to 
seek profit maximization (and, some market apologists wrongly 
 
category has lost power to discriminate between protected and unprotected speech.  
 33. Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial 
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 432 (1971) 
(arguing that some traditionally protected speech that happens to be profit-making is 
denied protection). 
 34. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 773 (1976) (holding that commercial speech by pharmacists advertising prescription 
prices was not outside the protection of the First Amendment).  
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assert, efficient results). In Jurgen Habermas’ terminology, in 
this “system realm,” money, not communicative action, provides 
the steering mechanism. The structural compulsion of the 
market means that neither liberty nor autonomy is at stake, at 
least to the extent this sphere works according to its ideal. 
(Autonomy may exist in respect to a person’s choice of the 
entity for which to work—but not the entity’s behavior.) Some 
commentators assert that the same is true in other “spheres.” 
For example, the pressure to get elected is said to control 
politicians’ speech. However, unlike the market, for which 
profitability and purported consequential efficiency provide the 
realm’s regulative ideals,35 the regulative ideal of the political 
sphere is for candidates to be persuasive about values actually 
held—and much of the structure of the political in any broad 
sense makes central the persuasive, expressive quality of “grass-
roots” speech. 
Second, a legally constituted business entity that communi-
cates or sponsors speech—it typically pays for and may deduct 
the cost of the speech as a business—is a legally constructed, 
instrumentally valued, artificial entity. Although defensible 
policies often grant these entities various freedoms, including 
some communicative freedom, the moral/constitutional 
autonomy-based justification for protecting speech of flesh and 
blood people is simply not at stake here. 
Third, market exchanges use property as power. Both 
parties use their property, money or labor not to persuade the 
other about values, attitudes, desirable associations, or facts 
about the world but directly to change the other’s situation in 
order to get the other party to do something she otherwise 
would not want to do—give the speaker her money, property, or 
service. This description essentially distinguishes the 
(instrumentalist) exchange and (substantive) use value of 
property. This instrumental aspect contrasts with speech (and 
voluntary associations) that often seek to influence other’s 
behavior but by influencing her understanding of her reasons, 
changing her beliefs, or by giving her new associational 
opportunities without seeking or obtaining any behavior that she 
would prefer to skip. The instrumental value that a listener 
places in her responsiveness to the persuasiveness of commercial 
 
 35. Seana Shiffrin has recently raised the question of whether we should accept the 
economists’ and the Weberians’ regulative ideal of the market—a point that raises issues 
I put aside here. 
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speech or a gun to her head contrasts to the substantive or 
solidarity value a listener places in her response to a solicitation 
for contribution. In the second circumstance, but not the first, 
the listener comes to value the recipient having that with which 
she parts. And the speaker in the charitable solicitation seeks to 
persuade the listener on agreement in values while in the 
commercial speech or gun case only seeks behavior that the 
listener now instrumentally values because of how the speaker 
has changed her options. Though a society should provide 
people with various opportunities to engage in mutual exercises 
of power, these exercises of power should always be subject to 
collective (legislative) control. Here, the value of liberty or 
autonomy is simply not at stake—which is probably why John 
Stuart Mill explained that any argument for free trade rested on 
different premises than the argument for liberty and why he was 
more ready to accept regulation of commercial promotional 
speech than other speech.36 
Each of these points about commercial speech depend on 
controversial analyses—which I have taken pains to defend 
elsewhere37—but the essential claim is the one made by the 
dissent in Bellotti (and subsequently adopted by the majority in 
Austin): “[W]hat some have considered to be the principal 
function of the First Amendment, the use of communication as a 
means of self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is 
not at all furthered by corporate speech. It is clear that the 
communications of profitmaking corporations . . . do not 
represent a manifestation of individual freedom or choice.”38 
Press. The arguments to deny protection to the speech of 
commercial entities immediately put into question the status of 
the press, which today is largely constituted by large market-
oriented entities. My autonomy argument seeks to justify 
individuals’ speech freedom. A full interpretation of the First 
Amendment must consider whether the press clause should have 
an independent meaning. History going back to the country’s 
founding suggests that it should and more specifically that its 
 
 36. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, ch. 5, in MILL 41, 115 (Alan 
Ryan ed., 1997) (discussing trade policies and communication). 
 37. C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 
981, 981–85, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019264; BAKER, supra note 15, at 194–
224. See generally Baker, supra note 3. 
 38. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804–05 (1978) (White, J., 
dissenting); see also Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) 
(distinguishing media corporations from other corporations because of the nature of 
media communications). 
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protection should relate broadly to its instrumental democratic 
roles.39 Elsewhere I have argued that, in place after place, 
existing judicial doctrine is incoherent without the assumption 
that the press clause has an independent meaning.40 This 
independent meaning explains holdings giving substantially 
different speech rights to media corporations than to other 
corporations. It explains the Court’s approval of limits on non-
press corporations’ speech rights that would be inconceivable if 
applied (and, therefore, for which there has been no attempt to 
apply) to press entities. Laws restrict non-press businesses’ 
speech in order to protect privacy, to stop unauthorized use of 
people’s image, and to prevent professional malpractice—all in 
ways inapplicable to the press. Lower courts have long granted 
journalists whose confidential sources might be exposed, but not 
individuals, some protection from compelled testimony. On the 
other hand, courts have upheld obligations for newspapers, 
broadcasters, and cable, but not for individuals, to carry speech 
mandated by the government. Though never thoroughly 
rationalized, limits on content discrimination apply differently 
and on basis of different rationales to the press than to 
individuals on the street corner. These points only begin to note 
the “specialness” of the press clause. 
The press’s role in democratic discourse—or, more broadly, 
its role of being an independent (of government) originator or 
reporter of information and vision—justifies, I have argued, the 
separate constitutional significance of the press and the 
differences between its treatment and the treatment of either 
individuals or other corporations. This different and 
instrumental basis for protection generally does not justify less 
(or more) affirmative speech rights for the media than for 
individuals.41 It does, however, justify some forms of special 
 
 39. See especially David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. 
REV. 455 (1983) (describing the history and scholarship of the Press Clause). Although 
Vincent Blasi does not read the historical evidence he marshaled in defense of the 
checking function to support the view that it is particularly the press that is valued for its 
potential performance of this checking function, I think the evidence he marshaled 
supports such a view. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 
1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977). 
 40. See generally C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause 
Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955 (2007). The normative theory for this view 
of the press is given in BAKER, supra note 15, at 225–71. See also C. EDWIN BAKER, 
MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 193–214 (2002) (discussing the implications of 
interpretations of the Press Clause); C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-
Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57 (describing the decision 
in Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)). 
 41. But see C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. 
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protections for the press as an institution and allows, arguably 
calls for, some special structural regulation of the press that have 
no coherent application to individuals. (For example, since the 
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, we do not allow other 
than self-ownership rules for individuals.) 
Obscenity. Obscenity doctrine presents another 
battleground. In Roth, Brennan indicated that the First 
Amendment did not protect obscenity but fully protected “all 
ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance.”42 
Brennan ignored Douglas’s later libertarian observation that 
obscene material clearly had importance to some people (e.g., its 
purchasers),43 presumably because his concern was “importance” 
within a marketplace of ideas. Having “any” such value, he 
subsequently explained, was key to the conceptual basis of that 
approach. But Brennan ultimately abandoned the Roth 
approach and rejected the majority’s “balancing” approach in 
Paris Adult Theatre.44 Although he explicitly relied on the 
ground that regulation of obscenity cannot avoid constitutionally 
intolerable vagueness, in a footnote Brennan implicitly offered a 
liberty or autonomy theory that paralleled Douglas’ approach.45 
Brennan indicated that he now accepted the earlier decision in 
Stanley v. Georgia, which he originally had not joined, possibly 
because it made little sense to give First Amendment (as 
opposed, maybe to Fourth Amendment) protection to 
possession within the home of otherwise unprotected material. 
Now his reasoning referred broadly to the objectionable nature 
of regulating speech involving “willing adult[s],” virtually code 
words for a liberty approach, and “the right to exercise 
‘autonomous control over the development and expression of 
one’s intellect, tastes, and personality.’”46 For individual 
autonomy, protection does make sense. Essentially, in Roth, his 
rejection of protection for obscenity was rooted in its lack of role 
in any search for truth—though it could have equally well been 
 
REV 891, 899 (2002) (noting some differences under the theory advanced here and noting 
that these differences conform to early American copyright law—and hence, maybe to 
original intent—and are still reflected in existing law). 
 42. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
 43. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 489–90 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 44. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 96–98, 97 (1973) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  
 45. Id. at 85 n.9. 
 46. Id. (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973)). 
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for its lack of role in public discourse. When he changed, he 
highlighted the relevance of obscenity for individual autonomy.47 
In short, existing doctrine denies protection to obscenity—
although given widespread availability at newsstands in most 
cities and everywhere on the internet of material hard not to 
describe as hard core, this quixotic denial of protection seems 
increasingly belabored outside the area of child pornography, 
where the constitutionally accepted evil is not obscene content 
but abuse involved in production. Still, obscenity remains a 
theoretically contentious area where surely different theories are 
better judged by their own appeal than by their conformity with 
current doctrine. Here, Brennan’s original reasoning, which has 
some coherence from a marketplace of ideas perspective, denies 
protection. So do most political speech theories, though not 
because pornography is without political effect. Like many 
activities or experiences, its effect reflects its potential to change 
the person who partakes, not its participation in public 
discourse—points forcefully made by MacKinnon in her critique 
of the dominant marketplace of ideas paradigm.48 From an 
autonomy perspective, the issue is easy, at least if one adds that 
even commercial production can be protected under the press 
clause. For the reasons Brennan eventually gives, obscenity 
should be protected 
Speech and Secrecy. Given their instrumentalism, any 
substantive autonomy theory and many versions of marketplace 
of ideas theory should have trouble distinguishing in principle 
the government keeping specified information secret and its 
prohibiting communication of that specified information in order 
to keep it unknown. Both interfere equally with listeners’ 
substantive autonomy. Both serve roughly the same government 
purposes. Thus, it might seem that either both government acts 
should be permissible or, if sufficient weight is placed on the 
information’s contribution to actors’ substantive autonomy or 
their search for truth or for political or other wisdom, both 
should be impermissible. Judicial doctrine, however, clearly 
rejects this symmetry. The Court, sometimes unanimously, 
 
 47. Though a subject for a different paper, this represents a more general move 
within Brennan’s free speech thinking, illustrated by his statement: “[F]reedom of 
expression is made inviolate by the First Amendment.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Va., 448 US 555, 585 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 48. CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993) (discussing defamation and 
discrimination, racial and sexual harassment, and equality and speech). But see C. Edwin 
Baker, Of Course, More Than Words, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181 (1994) (disputing the 
“theories or speech and equality that MacKinnon offers in ONLY WORDS”). 
!!BAKER-272-AUTONOMYANDFREESPEECH3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011  9:12 AM 
278 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:251 
 
invalidates limits on publication of information that the 
government can properly keep secret.49 Although difficult to 
explain on grounds of the substantive value of the information to 
people, this distinction follows easily from speakers’ (or the 
press’s) formal freedom to say whatever they choose (given their 
knowledge or imagination). The point is that government often 
has legitimate—important, maybe even compelling—ends but 
can pursue these only by means that do not violate people’s 
autonomy, or the press’s freedom, in respect to speech. 
Content Discrimination. Hornbook doctrine exhibits 
confusion over and routinely overstates the force of the doctrinal 
bar on content discrimination (and if, as I believe, Justice 
Kennedy is right,50 understates its proper force where it is 
properly applicable). Of course, no proponent of the doctrine 
imagines that it provides an objection to suppressing content 
which First Amendment theory does not identify as covered 
speech.51 Though disagreement exists over whether the First 
Amendment should protect for incitement to crime, obscenity, 
negligently false defamatory statements, and fighting words, 
once a “no” answer is given, the reasons to deny protection 
justify bans on the unprotected content. Still, standard versions 
of the doctrinal bar on content discrimination clearly create 
problems for any theory that claims heightened protection for 
political speech over non-political speech. 
The logic of autonomy theory, however, can be seen in 
Chicago Police Department v. Mosley,52 the case routinely cited 
for establishing the no content discrimination doctrine—
although any careful observer would find the doctrine rooted in 
 
 49. E.g., Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Va., 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978). The Court has 
also held that, although the state can keep certain information secret, once the state 
makes it publicly available or the press learns it independently, the state cannot stop its 
further communication. See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (name of rape 
victim); Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (identity of alleged juvenile 
delinquent); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 US 469 (1975) (name of rape victim). 
 50. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd, 502 U.S. 
105, 123–28 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 51. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396–96 (1992) (invalidating a city 
ordinance prohibiting bias-motivated disorderly conduct) may appear to contradict this 
claim, but it does not if it is seen, as it should, as an application of the O’Brien doctrine, 
which allows invalidating a law or its application if it restricts unprotected expressive 
conduct when the reason for the restriction must be understood as aiming at suppressing 
protected expression. Cf. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318–19 (1990) (holding 
that the Flag Burning Act violates the First Amendment). Then Scalia’s reasoning makes 
sense but he misapplied it in R.A.V. while the Court properly applied it in Va. v. Black, 
538 U.S. 343, 367–68 (2003).  
 52. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
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decisions from the 1930s and 1940s when the Court rejected 
permit requirements not constrained by clear standards and 
effectively identified the evil as potential of content 
discrimination by the local officials. Mosley offered three 
arguments. First, it referred to the importance of government 
neutrality, presumably within a marketplace of ideas. A 
requirement of neutrality cannot explain First Amendment 
mandates. It would rule out huge, constant governmental 
expenditures on speech and publications that promote its views 
on how issues should be resolved and what values ought to 
obtain. The Court offers approval of the government trying, by 
persuasion or school curriculum, to favor patriotism and to 
inculcate community values. More fundamentally, the whole 
legal structure inherently favors some views over others, which 
suggests that neutrality cannot be a standard or even a goal—
without an appropriate baseline from which no views would be 
advantaged. 
Second, the Court objected somewhat more plausibly to 
restrictions of speech on the basis of content that leaves open the 
possible permissibility of promotion of various viewpoints. 
According to the Court, “[T]he First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. . . . [It] may 
not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds 
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored 
or more controversial views.”53 Maybe (though only on various 
unrealistic assumptions) the marketplace of ideas eventually 
leads to what is true or wise, maybe public opinion is wise or at 
least appropriate, as long as no speech is suppressed by 
government (as opposed to by private corporate power or by 
socially-enforced civility rules). Nevertheless, it is hard to believe 
that Chicago’s content discrimination showed that Chicago 
favored labor picketing over—much less wanted to suppress—
assemblies celebrating the Fourth of July or speech promoting 
re-election of the mayor. 
At least in Mosley’s street-speech context, the Court’s only 
relevant argument easily follows from autonomy theory—though 
not, or at least not easily, from other theories. Specifically, the 
Court said: “Although preventing school disruption is a city’s 
legitimate concern, Chicago itself has determined that peaceful 
labor picketing during school hours is not an undue interference 
 
 53. Id. at 95–96. 
!!BAKER-272-AUTONOMYANDFREESPEECH3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011  9:12 AM 
280 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:251 
 
with school. Therefore, . . . Chicago may not maintain that other 
picketing disrupts the school unless that picketing is clearly more 
disruptive than the picketing Chicago already permits.”54 From 
the perspective of valuing autonomy, although government 
clearly must be permitted to use public property to advance 
public projects and, thus, to impose time and place limits on 
speech that constitute actual interferences with these projects, 
respect for individual expressive autonomy means that the 
expression must be allowed on public property when it does not 
constitute such an interference. Here, the rule against content 
discrimination serves merely as an evidentiary ground for finding 
that this respect for autonomy is absent. “The crucial question,” 
no matter whether the person wants “to ask the time or the 
weather forecast”55 or to engage in protest, “is whether the 
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal 
activity of a particular place at a particular time.”56 
Institutionally bound speech and unconstitutional 
conditions. These huge topics cannot be adequately explored 
here but since they are often said to embarrass autonomy 
theories, I briefly suggest, to the contrary, that autonomy theory 
provides the best insight into the morass. When government sets 
up a governmental structure—a court, legislature, an 
administrative agency, or, I have argued, an election57—or when 
it offers a job or a grant, a person (say, an autonomous agent) 
who chooses to become enmeshed58 must accept those 
restrictions on her autonomy that are necessary for the 
 
 54. Id. at 100. (citations omitted). The Court treated this argument as an equal 
protection matter and later noted that disruption can be handled by a more “narrowly 
tailored” or “narrowly drawn” statute. Id. at 101–02. Interestingly, though citing equal 
protection cases for the narrowly tailored standard, all other cases cited to illustrate why 
the law failed this constitutional standard were First Amendment cases. See id. at 101 n.8; 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (prohibiting the 
wearing of armbands violates rights of expression); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 386 (1968) (holding that burning a selective service card is not symbolic speech); 
Niemotko v. Md., 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951) (holding that charging defendants for religious 
meetings in a public park violated protection of speech and religion); Saia v. N.Y., 334 
U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (holding that banning loudspeakers in a general way violated 
freedom of speech). 
 55. Hill v. Colo., 530 US 703, 768 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 56. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 US 104, 116 (1972).  
 57. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing that elections and campaign speech should be 
distinguished from the broader category of political speech in First Amendment 
doctrine). 
 58. Thus, restrictions on out of court statements by criminal defendants or 
witnesses called by subpoena should be much more problematic than restrictions on the 
prosecution or police for an autonomy theory. 
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legitimate operation of the institution, successful carrying out 
the aims of the grant program, or proper performance of the job. 
This is the compatibility standard noted in the paragraph above. 
Though there is a role-based contextual loss of authority 
(autonomy) over both her political and non-political speech, this 
loss is not inconsistent with the general attribution of autonomy. 
The limits do not disrespect as opposed to presuppose the 
person’s general status as an autonomous agent. The limit 
becomes disrespect only when the condition or institutionally-
bound contextual restriction on expression is not required by the 
legitimate functions of the institution or goals of the job or grant. 
Other theories may reach similar conclusions though 
arguably the autonomy theory is most straightforward at getting 
at what is normatively at stake. Post’s political discourse theory, 
for example, might do so because, at bottom it is an autonomy 
theory that differs from the one I offer most overtly in that it 
attributes autonomy to a person only when and because the 
person is participating in public discourse. Since, however, his 
theory does not make an attribution of autonomy as a 
fundamental baseline but rather only contextually when a person 
is participating in public discourse, it presents a quandary. A 
person presumptively has no (attributed) autonomy despite 
speech with overt political relevance (as in Connick59) when 
enmeshed in activities organized by the government in exercise 
of it managerial (as opposed to its governance) authority.60 To be 
consistent with the case law, however, his theory must explain 
why a person sometimes suddenly obtains the attributed political 
discourse-based autonomy when engaged in politically-themed 
but assertedly private banter with a boy friend or in private 
discussions with her supervisor.61 
 
 59. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that the discharge of an 
assistant district attorney for political speech did not violate the First Amendment). 
 60. See, e.g., POST, supra note 20, at 179–98 (discussing concepts of democratic 
community from “the specific perspective of the American legal system”). 
 61. Rankin v. McPherson. 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987) (holding that in some cases 
involving private conversation matters of public concern still trigger First Amendment 
rights); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417 (1979) (holding that 
public employees do not lose the right of free speech because of arranging to speak 
privately with an employer). Weinstein’s politically-centered theory emphasizes political 
content more than context, and, therefore, avoids Post’s precise problem. He could also 
argue that autonomy theory has trouble here because the Court requires the speech be 
about a matter of “public concern.” Though I find the propriety of the limitation to 
matters of “public concern” doubtful, I can understand that a court which wanted to 
avoid continual second guessing of routine employment matters might conclude that 
firings due to the speech in categories that it does not protect in this context will seldom 
really reflect dismissal for lack of cause and that adequate protection can be best left to 
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More. I have avoided discussion of defamation law, possibly 
the area where case law most obviously contradicts my 
understanding of autonomy theory.62 And other areas obviously 
could be examined—hate speech and copyright and privacy 
would be obvious additions—but I fear that I have already over-
burdened the patience of readers. Those areas discussed here 
suffice to show, I believe, how autonomy theory best explains 
many results that I, and I believe most First Amendment 
commentators, approve and shows that its critical force, giving 
specific, contested (but I believe persuasive) answers in areas 
that conflict with currently prevailing doctrine and in areas 
where controversy continues to rage. 
 
 
 
normal contract law or labor activism.  
 62. Contrary to the Court, autonomy theory would, I believe, justify general 
application of the New York Times standard: “[K]nowledge that [the defamatory 
content] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.” N.Y. Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). I would think, though, that Post would also have 
trouble here. The Court’s restriction of constitutional protection to talk about public 
officials and figures and, with reduced protection, to talk about public issues provides a 
content, not a public discourse, focus—making it possibly consistent with Meiklejohn’s 
political speech theory, but not Post’s. I do not see, for example, how Post could 
conclude that I would be engaged in public discourse if I told mutual friends in private 
that Congressman Dan is a thief in order to help them protect their personal assets in 
their personal dealings with Dan. Cf. Post, supra note 1. 
